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Abstract  
This study examines the phenomenon of co-CEOs within publicly traded firms. Although shared 
executive leadership is not widespread, it occurs within some very prominent firms. We find that co-
CEOs generally complement each other in terms of educational background or executive 
responsibilities. Our results show that firms most likely to appoint co-CEOs have lower leverage, a 
more limited firm focus, less independent board structure, fewer advising directors, lower 
institutional ownership and greater levels of merger activity. The governance structure of co-CEO 
firms suggest that co-CEOships can serve as an alternative governance mechanism, with co-CEO 
mutual monitoring substituting for board or external monitoring and co-CEO complementary skills 
substituting for board advising. An event study indicates that the market reacts positively to 
appointments of co-CEOs while a propensity score analysis shows that the presence of co-CEOs 
increases firm valuation.  
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It Takes Two: 
The Incidence and Effectiveness of co-CEOs 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In spite of extensive interdisciplinary analysis on the effect of senior corporate 
executive management on corporate decisions and performance (e.g., Barnard (1938), 
Selznick (1957), Rosen (1990), Bertrand and Schoar (2003), Wasserman (2003), Adams, 
Almeida, and Ferreira (2005),  Tichy and Cohen (1997), Denis and Denis (1995), Weisbach 
(1995), Parrino (1997), Malmendier and Tate (2005), Dahya, Garcia, and van Bommel 
(2009)), the present literature fails to examine the effect that alternative structures of CEO 
leadership might have on corporate performance and behavior. More specifically, existing 
empirical literature ignores CEO leadership models that involve the sharing of executive 
power and how such arrangements affect the ability of a CEO to influence corporate behavior.  
In this study, we examine the effect of shared power on corporate governance, corporate 
value, and performance by focusing on the case of co-CEOs.  We use the Alvarez and 
Svejenova (2005) definition of co-CEOs as “two executives who, over time, perform the top 
job together in a coordinated fashion and are held jointly accountable for the company or 
unit’s results.” 
Empirically, the ability of senior management to influence corporate behavior is 
usually measured indirectly, with most studies using specific events or proxies.  Denis and 
Denis (1995), Weisbach (1995), Parrino (1997), and Huson, Malatesta, and Parrino (2004) 
focus on the valuation impact of senior  management turnover while Malmendier and Tate 
(2005) analyze the effect of managerial overconfidence on corporate merger and acquisition 
decisions. Adams et al. (2005) use several proxies for CEO power and find that stocks exhibit 
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greater variability for firms run by powerful CEOs.  Easterwood and Raheja (2008) examine 
the influence that CEOs have relative to the board of directors when the firm is 
underperforming. Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer (2008) construct CEO salary as a percentage 
of the aggregate compensation paid to the firm’s top 5 executives as a proxy for CEO 
centrality and find that CEO centrality affects firm performance.
1
 In contrast to this previous 
research, our study provides a unique opportunity for a direct examination of management’s 
ability to influence corporate activity by an analysis of the impact of an alternative leadership 
structure. 
 The presence of two individuals simultaneously serving as the CEO of a firm has the 
potential to influence the firm’s decision-making in ways that are very different from that of a 
solitary CEO.  First, co-CEOs often bring complementary skills to the firm’s senior leadership 
position, providing a range of competencies and perspectives that might not be present in a 
single individual.  A co-CEOship also allows for the simultaneous presence of senior 
leadership at locations that are separated by time and distance or the simultaneous 
examination of two different issues of strategic importance.  
 Pearce and Conger (2003) argue that co-leadership is justifiable in many 
circumstances since senior managers of complex organizations usually do not possess all the 
skills and competencies necessary for successful leadership. Consequently, more than one 
leader might be needed to complete the tasks assigned to the CEO.  Similarly, O’Toole, 
Galbraith, and Lawler (2002) posit that two CEOs are better than one when the challenges 
facing a firm are so complex that they require a set of skills too broad to be possessed by any 
one individual. 
                                                 
1
 Exceptions to these approaches are studies by Bertrand and Schoar (2003) and Frank and Goyal (2007) who 
analyze the effect of management on firm outcomes by using fixed effects in their regression analyses to control 
for the effect of managers.  
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 The presence of co-CEOs, however, might also result in sub-optimal or disjointed 
decision-making by the firm.  Mintzberg (1989) and Hackman (2002) argue that co-CEO 
arrangements are plagued by coordination problems and interpersonal conflicts. The strong 
egos and personalities of CEOs can lead to friction and competition for power between 
individuals. Any inability of co-CEOs to compromise can cause loss of corporate focus and 
conflicted decision-making. Because of these factors, Alvarez and Svejenova (2005) view the 
co-CEO structure as inherently instable and generally not sustainable over a long period of 
time.   
 In this study, we pose four broad research questions as they relate to the existence of 
co-CEOs.  Our first question concerns the extent to which a co-CEO structure exists among 
U.S. public corporations.  Although such arrangements might be common among family 
firms, the practice of co-CEOs for the broader set of publicly traded firms remains 
unexplored.  The literature appears to assume that all firms are led by solitary CEOs.  
Our second research question examines the factors that might account for the presence 
of a co-CEO structure within a firm. The existing literature only hints at what might explain 
such a leadership arrangement.  O’Toole et al. (2002) and Pearce and Conger (2003) argue 
that co-leadership is the correct organizational structure for complex organizations.  
Wasserman, Nohria, and Anand (2001) imply that two CEOs might be more appropriate for 
firms in which the CEO’s decisional power is more influential, such as companies with low 
levels of debt, high amounts of cash, or operating in highly concentrated industries. On the 
other hand, more powerful CEOs might be less willing to share leadership (Hackman (2002)).  
Beyond these factors, there is anecdotal evidence suggesting that companies involved in 
mergers or family affiliations are more likely to appoint co-CEOs.  We examine the 
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significance of these variables later in our empirical analysis.  
The third research question is related to our analysis of co-CEO determinants and 
investigates the nature of a firm’s governance structure when corporate executive leadership 
is shared.  It might be that a co-CEOship facilitates the concentration of managerial power 
within a small group of executives, leading to entrenchment.  In this case, we anticipate that 
existing governance mechanisms are weak and that the co-CEOs are better able to capture the 
perquisites of an entrenched management.  Alternatively, co-CEOs might serve as mutual 
monitors and the joint leadership of two co-CEOs functions as a substitute for more 
traditional corporate governance mechanisms. Kandel and Lazear (1992) note that when 
organizations cannot easily monitor the actions of their agents, they may rely on a process of 
mutual monitoring to achieve the desired accountability. Additionally, co-CEOs with 
complementary expertise can supplement or even substitute the advising provided by other 
board directors. Our logistic regression analysis suggests that co-CEOs offer mutual 
monitoring and compensate for the reduced advising levels provided by other board members. 
Moreover, our empirical results regarding compensation levels and the effect of co-CEOs on 
performance are inconsistent with managerial entrenchment and suggest mutual monitoring. 
Our model of the decision to appoint co-CEOs is robust to possible endogeneity with the 
firm’s existing governance structure, further supporting the substitute monitoring and advising 
functions of co-CEOs.   
Our last research question focuses on the ability of co-CEOs to provide effective 
leadership to the firm. Given the potential for shared leadership to impact corporate decision-
making, we examine what effect the presence of co-CEOs might exert on both firm 
performance and value.   
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Our initial descriptive analysis of co-CEOs provides several interesting results. First, 
we observe that the average length of co-CEOs is approximately 4.5 years, which is 
comparable to that of solitary CEOs (Shivdasani and Yermack (1999)), suggesting that this 
arrangement is more stable than previously believed. We also find that co-CEOships are 
broadly distributed across industry types. Finally, we observe that co-CEOs generally 
complement each other in terms of educational background or executive responsibilities.  
Our empirical findings show that the most significant determinant of co-CEO 
arrangements is M&A activity.  Firms involved in a merger will sometimes decide to appoint 
the CEOs of the acquirer and target as co-CEOs of the new firm.  Such an arrangement can be 
used to accelerate merger approval and to ease the implementation of the merger. We also 
find that companies in which CEOs have more discretionary power (e.g., firms with lower 
leverage or operating in a more concentrated industry) are more likely to adopt a shared 
leadership arrangement.  We do not find that family firms or more complex firms are more 
likely to appoint co-CEOs to lead them.  
We obtain important results concerning the governance structure of firms with co-
CEOs. We find that the power of the CEOs, the percent of independent directors, institutional 
ownership, and the level of corporate debt are all inversely related to the probability of a co-
CEOship. Moreover, the lower number of independent directors for firms adopting co-
CEOships requires most of these directors to be members of audit, compensation, and 
nominating committees leaving less directors to offer advising (according to the measure 
introduced by Faleye, Hoitash, and Hoitash (2009)). We also establish that there are important 
differences in compensation between co-CEOs and solitary CEOs, with co-CEOs receiving 
proportionately significantly less incentive compensation than solitary CEOs.  We conclude 
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from these results that the mutual monitoring and advising provided by shared executive 
leadership might substitute for more traditional governance mechanisms. 
Our results regarding the determinants of shared leadership help explain why co-
CEOships are not a common organizational form.  Firms with lower leverage, a more limited 
corporate focus, less independent boards, lower institutional ownership and a higher level of 
merger activity are more likely to appoint co-CEOs. Only a limited number of firms are able 
to satisfy these conditions. Particularly, past merger and acquisition activity has the greatest 
influence on creating a co-CEOship. The relative infrequency of M&As for the average U.S. 
public corporation provides a partial explanation why co-CEOships rarely occur. Only 3.5% 
of the firm-year COMPUSTAT observations experience at least one M&A transaction over a 
three-year period whereas the corresponding percentage for our sample of co-CEO firms is 
23%. Further understanding of the relative rarity of co-CEOs might reside in behavioral 
explanations related to interpersonal conflict, hubris, and managerial over-confidence (e.g, 
Roll (1986), Hackman (2002), and Malmendier and Tate (2005)).  
We also examine the market reaction and performance effects resulting from a co-
CEOship.  We find that there is a positive market reaction to the announcement of co-CEOs to 
lead a firm.  We discover that the presence of co-CEOs is associated with a higher market-to-
book ratio (MB).  This result suggests that the design of the leadership structure, such as a co-
CEO arrangement, can influence firm value.
2
   
Our findings also contribute to our understanding of the relation between top 
executive functions and firm activity in two ways.  First, it complements and supports studies 
                                                 
2
 There is no inconsistency between this result and the mutual monitoring of co-CEOs which substitutes for other 
governance mechanisms.  Corporate governance is only one of the factors that affect a firm’s value.  Co-CEOs 
might improve firm value by complementary expertise and by mutual advising. This is suggested by our finding 
that 90% of our sample co-CEOships demonstrate complementarity in CEO education, job responsibilities, or 
both. 
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such as Bertrand and Schoar (2003) which report a significant managerial influence on firm 
policies and behaviors.  Second, it shows for the first time that a specific executive 
organizational structure can have a significant impact on firm value. 
It is important to note that our findings regarding corporate value do not imply that 
more firms should adopt a shared leadership structure.  We base our valuation analysis on 
propensity score matched samples and therefore compare the firm’s market-to-book ratio with 
co-CEO leadership to the unobserved market-to-book ratio that would have occurred with a 
solitary CEO.  Improvements in market-to-book ratios only show that firms with shared 
leadership improved their valuation.  Our results do not imply that any firm could appoint co-
CEOs and enjoy higher value. 
 
2.   The determinants of co-CEOs and their relation to governance and firm value   
In this section we further develop the research questions which guide our empirical 
investigation of co-CEOs in U.S. firms. These questions focus on the incidence and 
determinants of co-CEOship in the U.S., the nature of the firm’s governance when senior 
corporate leadership is shared, and the effect of shared leadership on firm performance and 
value.   
2.1.   Determinants of shared leadership 
O’Toole et al. (2002) and Pearce and Conger (2003) argue that complex organizations 
might benefit from the complementary skills of two CEOs.  For example, multinational 
companies might hire a CEO to lead the domestic operations of the firm, and a second CEO 
to manage its international operations.  Furthermore, diversified companies could benefit 
from co-CEOs that have expertise in different industries.  Similar to Coles, Daniel, and 
8 
 
Naveen (2008), we measure firm complexity by firm size and the number of business 
segments.  If complex firms are more likely to benefit from co-CEOs, then these proxies for 
complexity should be positively related to the probability that a firm has a shared corporate 
leadership structure.  
Companies in which the CEO’s decisional power is more influential might also benefit 
from co-CEO leadership.  Specifically, Wasserman et al. (2001) argue that when the external 
environment, perhaps due to high levels of industry concentration, provides firms with few 
opportunities, CEOs must make the most of each opportunity. This increases the overall 
influence of CEOs on firm performance.  Further, they note that CEOs have a larger impact 
on firm performance when financial resources are abundant.  Firms with low levels of debt 
have future borrowing capabilities and are less constrained by covenants while those with 
large amounts of cash have uncommitted resources available to the CEO.  The presence of 
slack resources allows a CEO to pursue valuable projects or to waste capital on poor  
investments. In either case, the CEO’s resource decisions will impact firm performance.  The 
conjecture that firms with larger free cash flows and less debt are more likely to benefit from 
co-CEOs is also consistent with Jensen (1986).  Jensen contends that agency conflicts are 
more pronounced when interest and principal payment amounts are smaller, and free cash 
flow is greater. Therefore, the mutual monitoring provided by co-CEOs might reduce agency 
costs and could benefit high free-cash-flow, low debt firms.    
Based on these arguments, we hypothesize a series of relations. First, we anticipate 
that leverage is inversely related to the probability of shared corporate leadership. We 
estimate the firm’s debt level by its long-term debt to total assets ratio (D). High amounts of 
cash suggest greater free cash flow and correspondingly more resources for the CEO to 
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direct towards preferred investments or perquisite consumption. Thus, we hypothesize that 
firms with higher levels of free cash flow (FCF) are more likely to have co-CEOs. Because 
industry concentration implies that there might be fewer investment opportunities available 
to the firm, thereby increasing the importance of each strategic decision by the CEO, we 
hypothesize that a firm’s corresponding industry Herfindahl index (HERF) will positively 
affect its likelihood of having co-CEOs. 
According to  Mintzberg (1989) and Hackman (2002) the power struggle between co-
CEOs is the larger limitation of this organizational structure.  As a consequence, more 
powerful CEOs might be more reluctant to accept to share their leadership.  Similar to 
Adams et al. (2005), we measure CEO power with an indicator equal to 1 if the CEOs are the 
only insiders of the firm.  We expect this indicator variable to be negatively related to co-
CEO incidence. 
2.2. Governance of firms with co-CEOs 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) present a model of corporate governance based on the 
power struggle between the CEO and the board.  They argue that boards of directors are less 
effective at monitoring CEOs who possess high levels of power and prestige. This reduction 
in the board’s monitoring ability might be more pronounced when the leadership of the firm 
is shared by two CEOs.  Thus, co-leadership might concentrate more authority with the 
CEOs, and further weaken the board’s ability to provide oversight.  This can result in an 
increase in the degree of managerial entrenchment.  Alternatively, co-CEOs might function 
as mutual monitors.  In this case, co-leadership substitutes for the monitoring of CEOs 
provided by the board of directors or institutional equity ownership.  In addition to 
monitoring, board directors also provide advising to the firm’s management (Adams (2009)).  
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If co-CEOs complement each other in expertise and in their job responsibility (as confirmed 
by our univariate analysis) there might be in less need for advising by other board directors. 
To empirically examine the nature of the relation between the board and the co-CEOs, 
we introduce several different variables into our analysis. We measure the monitoring quality 
of the board by the proportion of independent board members (PERINDEP).  Similar to 
Faleye et al. (2009), we measure the advising strength of the board based on how many 
independent directors are free from committee work (less involved in monitoring). Our 
advising measure (ADVISINGBOARD) equals 1 if only a minority of independent board 
members serve on at least two of the three major committees of the board (audit, 
compensation and nominating). We measure the extent of outside monitoring with the 
percentage of institutional ownership (INSTOWN).  The design of compensation contracts for 
senior executives can be used as another governance device within the firm. Consequently, 
we examine the nature of co-CEO compensation by comparing it with that of solitary CEOs.  
Most importantly, we analyze the extent to which incentive based compensation is utilized in 
the payment of co-CEOs.  To the extent that co-CEOs provide mutual monitoring, we expect 
that less incentive-based compensation is necessary. 
2.3. Effect of co-leadership on firm performance  
This examination of co-CEOs provides an ideal laboratory in which to study the direct 
impact of top management on firm value and performance.  By comparing the performance of 
firms led by co-CEOs to that of similar companies with solitary CEOs, we evaluate the effect 
that this alternative leadership structure has on valuation and operating performance. We 
measure valuation with the market-to-book ratio (M/B) and operating performance with the 
return on assets (ROA). 
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3. Sample construction and data description  
We construct our sample by searching ProQuest for press releases and articles that 
mention co-CEOs between 1998 and 2008. We then eliminate non-U.S. companies, private 
companies, and public companies not covered by either CRSP or COMPUSTAT.  After this 
further screening, our sample consists of 111 firms with a total of 358 firm-year 
observations.
3
  We then collect co-CEO information, board characteristics, and insider 
ownership from annual proxy statements, accounting data from COMPUSTAT, and stock 
prices and returns from CRSP.
4
  Data regarding the characteristics of CEO compensation for 
our co-CEO firms is obtained from annual corporate proxy statements and the EXECUCOMP 
database.  Our sample includes some very large firms such as Verizon Communications and 
Citigroup, as well as highly recognizable companies such as Bed, Bath & Beyond, and 
American Eagle Outfitters. 
The small size of our sample is not inconsistent with those studies appearing in the 
literature that examine specialized events or transactions. Because these events often occur 
infrequently, the empirical analysis is executed with samples much smaller than the large 
panel data sets of traditional corporate finance studies. For instance, Chalmers, Dann, and 
Harford (2002) construct a sample of 72 IPO firms to examine the relation between the 
purchase of D&O insurance by corporate insiders and subsequent performance.  Fich and 
White (2005) examine the issue of why CEOs reciprocally sit on each other boards using a 
sample of only 70 CEOs.  Dunbar and Foerster (2008) investigate the performance of IPOs 
that were initially withdrawn with a sample of 138 offerings. 
To assess the degree of complementarity in the education and executive 
                                                 
3
 The co-CEO pairs in our sample are 118 because for 7 of our firms at least one of the two co-CEOs change 
during the sample period. 
4
 We retrieve the corporate governance data for the control sample, needed for our logistic regressions, from the 
IRRC – Risk Metrics database. 
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responsibilities of the co-CEOs, we access a number of different sources.  We first search 
Marquis’ Who’s Who to obtain relevant biographical data for our sample co-CEOs.  We then 
examine the firm’s annual reports and proxy statements for each of the years of the co-
CEOship’s existence.  Further, we search the firm’s website for additional information 
regarding the educational achievements and professional assignments of the co-CEOs.  We 
also use search engines such as Google, Yahoo, and Factiva to identify relevant press releases 
regarding our sample co-CEOs.   
We obtain a description of each co-CEO’s job duties from several sources. Based 
upon a review of annual reports, proxy statements, and various press releases, we are able to 
ascertain the specific responsibilities assigned to each of the co-CEOs.  Overlapping or 
similar responsibilities in a given area are coded as an uncomplimentary co-CEOship. When 
information regarding the executive responsibilities of each co-CEO is unavailable, the co-
CEOship is excluded from this analysis.  
 
4.  The extent and nature of shared executive leadership 
4.1. Profile of the sample firms  
Table 1 contains the initial descriptive statistics for our sample firms and helps 
establish the relative incidence of co-CEOs among U.S. industries. In panel A, we observe 
that the 111 sample firms are distributed over seven, one-digit Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) industry groupings.  Manufacturers represent nearly a third of the sample 
(30%), while about a quarter (23%) is contained in service industries. Approximately another 
quarter (25%) of our sample is located in finance, insurance and real estate.  The remaining 
sample firms are distributed across wholesale-retail trade (13%), transportation and 
communication (6%), mining and construction (3%) and public administration (1%).   
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In panel B we examine circumstances surrounding the creation of co-CEOships among 
our sample firms. We determine that one fifth of the co-CEOships are associated with merger 
and acquisition (M&A) activity. These co-CEOs arrangements are finalized at the completion 
of a merger by nominating the CEOs of the two merging companies as co-CEOs of the new 
company.  The non-merger related circumstances include family succession influences (25%), 
the existence of multiple corporate founders (15%), and its use to smooth the transition 
between an incumbent CEO near retirement and a new incoming CEO (9%).
5
   
We examine the duration of co-CEOships in panel C. We observe that at both the firm 
and individual level, the average tenure of a co-CEOship is about 4.5 years.  This result 
suggests that co-CEOs have tenures not much shorter than those of solitary CEOs as reported 
by Shivdasani and Yermack (1999).  Interim co-CEOships (those put in place just for 
transitioning between a retiring CEO  and the successor) are the shortest, with an average of 
about one year.  Co-CEOships due to mergers are also quite short with an average of 2.4 
years.  This result suggests that two CEOs joined together as a result of a merger might launch  
a power struggle that reduces the length of their shared tenure. 
In Panel D we present the role played by co-CEOs on the board of directors of their 
firms.  In the great majority of our firm-year observations (93%),  both co-CEOs sit on the 
board of directors. In 84% of our firm-year observations, at least one of the two co-CEOs is 
the chair of the board.  These results provide preliminary support for our hypothesis that co-
CEO mutual monitoring substitutes for other CEO monitoring mechanisms such as separation 
between the CEO and board chair positions. 
                                                 
5
 The incidence of family firms in our sample is comparable to the proportion of family firms among all public 
US corporations.  Anderson and Reeb (2003) find that over 35 percent of S&P 500 firms are family controlled; 
Gadhoum, Lang, and Young (2005) observe that approximately 25 percent of U.S. corporations is controlled and 
managed by a family. 
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4.2. Complementarity within the CEO dyad  
The presence of complementarity can be a motivating force for the creation of a co-
CEOship and might help explain the subsequent performance of the CEO dyad.  In this 
section we examine the extent to which complementarity exists between the co-CEOs in terms 
of educational achievement and executive responsibilities.  We define complementarity as the 
presence of off-setting skills, abilities or experiences within the co-CEOship.   
We begin our analysis in Table 2 with a series of descriptive statistics regarding the 
education level and academic fields of study for our sample co-CEOs.  In panel A we observe 
that 56.5% of co-CEOs possess a graduate degree while another 40.2% hold a bachelor’s 
degree.  Only about 3.3% of our sample co-CEOs failed to earn a college degree. In panel B 
we analyze the field of study for the highest education level attained by our sample co-CEOs.  
We observe that the MBA is the most popular graduate degree and is the most frequently 
earned degree overall.  Over half of the co-CEOs hold an MBA.  Business is the most popular 
undergraduate field of study, with almost 45% of the co-CEOs majoring in this discipline.  In 
Panel C we present the highest educational level of co-CEO pairs.  For the majority of our co-
CEO pairs (69.7%), at least one co-CEO has a graduate degree. 
In Table 3 we examine complementarity among co-CEOs in both their field of 
academic study and the assignment of executive responsibilities.  Our use of educational 
achievement as a measure of complementarity within a co-CEOship is justified to the extent 
that formal education is associated with an individual gaining the knowledge, abilities, and 
skills that will ultimately be useful as a senior executive.  
Educational complementarity occurs when one of the co-CEOs has at least one 
academic degree different from the other co-CEO.  The findings in panel A of Table 3 suggest 
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that educational complementarity is extensive among our sample co-CEOs.  Nearly three-
quarters of our co-CEO dyads possess at least one different academic degree between them.    
Panel B contains our analysis of complementarity based upon the responsibilities 
assigned to each co-CEO.  This complementarity captures the ability of a co-CEO to generate 
efficiencies in the management of the firm by eliminating redundant supervision and 
assigning oversight for an area to the best qualified co-CEO.  
Panel B shows that most co-CEOships are structured so that executive assignments are 
complementary in nature and that overlap in responsibilities is eliminated.  This suggests that 
co-CEOships might be able to generate managerial efficiencies by their coordinated 
assignment of executive oversight responsibilities.  Yet, a significant portion of our co-
CEOships (i.e, 37.2%) remains uncomplementary with regards to job responsibilities. This 
suggests that joint or overlapping responsibilities continue to remain an important way of 
structuring senior executive functions for many co-CEOships. Internal politics, incomplete 
expertise, or merger negotiations might be among the factors that account for this redundant 
oversight.  Indeed, in untabulated results, we find that 68% of our sample firms adopting a co-
CEO structure as the result of a merger have an uncomplementary assignment of executive 
responsibilities. 
In panel C, we examine the extent of joint complementarity in the field of study and 
the assignment of executive responsibilities.  We observe that 42.6% of our co-CEOships 
demonstrate complementarity in both academic discipline and supervisory duties.  Nearly 
another third of our sample exhibits complementarity in academic preparation, but without a 
corresponding complementarity in executive responsibilities. The remaining quarter of our 
sample (25.9%) that is not complementary regarding the field of academic study is 
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approximately evenly distributed between the complementary and uncomplementary 
assignment of executive responsibilities.  Only 11% of the co-CEOships in our sample fail to 
demonstrate any type of complementarity. 
 
5.  Determinants of shared leadership 
In this section we examine the determinants of shared leadership. We examine what 
financial and industry characteristics might explain a firm’s decision to adopt a co-CEO 
structure.  We also analyze the nature of the firm’s governance when corporate executive 
leadership is shared.  To begin our analysis, we construct two samples of co-CEO firms.  The 
first is our aggregate set of firms with co-CEOs.  The second sample excludes those firms 
whose co-CEOship is the result of a merger.  This allows us to control for the unique 
governance or negotiation terms often associated with a merger that might lead to the creation 
of co-CEOs.  We also estimate several different specifications of logistic regressions to 
capture the simultaneous effect of various factors in the decision to create co-CEOs.  
5.1. Univariate examination of shared leadership 
In Table 4 we provide a comparison of median values of possible determinants of a 
co-CEO leadership structure between the entire sample, the non M&A subsample, and a 
control sample consisting of all COMPUSTAT firms with solitary CEOs.   
We observe a number of important differences between the co-CEO firms and those 
that operate with a single CEO.  First, we note that co-CEO firms are larger than the solitary 
CEO firm as measured by the market value of equity.  This result holds regardless whether the 
M&A firms are included or not.  Even the non-merger co-CEO firms are about three times as 
large as the solitary CEO firms.  Co-CEO firms also have higher leverage and a greater 
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number of business segments.  These results, however, appear to be driven by the M&A 
subsample firms; when we exclude the merger-related co-CEO firms, the degree of financial 
leverage and the number of business segments are not significantly different from the solitary 
CEO sample.
6
 
We also observe some important differences in board structure between co-CEO firms 
and the control firms.  Boards of the co-CEO firms have fewer independent directors and 
those directors are less available to offer advising.  The co-CEO firms, however, tend to have 
a higher level of institutional equity ownership.  Firms that adopt a co-CEOship structure are 
also less likely to have CEOs as the only insiders of the board (CEOPOWER). 
Finally, we observe that the co-CEO firms operate in more concentrated industries 
than solitary CEO firms.  This result is consistent with the implications of Wasserman et al 
(2001) that co-CEO arrangements might be more valuable in concentrated industries, where 
CEO decision-making has the potential to make a greater impact. 
5.2. Multivariate analysis  
In Table 5 we present the results from our multivariate analysis of the relation between 
firm characteristics and the presence of co-CEOs.  We design our regression analysis such 
that the dependent variable is equal to one when a firm is managed by two CEOs and zero 
otherwise.  We estimate several different models which include or exclude controls for year 
and industry fixed effects. 
We recognize that the relation between governance characteristics such as board size, 
number of independent directors, institutional ownership, and the presence of co-CEOs might 
be endogenous.  Governance characteristics can, among other factors, determine the 
                                                 
6
 In a multivariate setting leverage is negatively related to the probability of appointing co-CEOs  after 
controlling for the M&A status of the firm.  
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probability of shared CEO leadership.  Alternatively, the presence of co-CEOs might 
influence the design of a firm’s corporate governance.  We control for this potential bilateral 
causality by estimating a set of logistic regressions in which the independent variables are 
lagged by one year.  As a robustness check, we estimate a set of instrumental variables (IV) 
probit regressions in which we instrument our governance variables with their one-year 
lagged counterparts.  These results are discussed in Section 8.  
Table 5 confirms the existence of a number of significant variables related to the 
presence of a co-CEOship. We find that smaller companies are more likely to have co-CEOs.  
This result is the opposite of what found in the univariate analysis presented in Table 4.  The 
governance variables for the single-CEO firms are retrieved from IRRC–Risk Metrics.  This 
database covers a limited set of firms, mostly large.  The restriction imposed by our 
governance database is likely responsible for the negative coefficient of the size variable. We 
observe that the existence of M&A activity exerts a positive and significant influence on the 
probability of a co-CEO.  Companies with lower levels of debt are also more likely to have 
co-CEOs as are firms operating in more concentrated industries or with greater free cash flow. 
Thus, we find that firms in which CEO decision-making is more influential are more likely to 
have shared executive leadership.  This result is consistent with Wasserman et al. (2001) that 
companies in which the CEOs have more decisional influence might benefit from co-CEO 
leadership.  However, firms in which CEOs have more power on a governance standpoint 
(being the only insider on the board) are less likely to adopt a shared leadership structure as 
evidenced by the negative sign and significance of our CEO power indicator variable. 
All of the governance variables (i.e., percentage of independent directors, board 
advising, and institutional ownership) are statistically significant and suggest a direct 
19 
 
causality from a firm’s governance characteristics to the decision to hire co-CEOs.  We 
observe that the percentage of independent directors on the board is negatively related to the 
probability of co-CEOs.  This is consistent with the substitute governance effect and our 
univariate results regarding board independence. Equity ownership by institutional investors, 
an important source of external monitoring, is inversely related to the likelihood of having co-
CEOs.  Further, leverage is negatively related to the probability of co-CEO leadership, 
suggesting that any decrease in monitoring by creditors is offset with a greater probability of 
the firm selecting co-CEOs.  Finally, the advising board variable is negative and significant 
suggesting that firms with less advising directors are more likely to implement shared 
leadership. Overall, the findings for these variables support the argument that co-CEOs can 
substitute, at least partially, for other corporate governance mechanisms.
7
 
The negative sign and significance of the advising variable does not directly imply that 
these boards provide better monitoring.  These boards have less independent directors than the 
average COMPUSTAT firm and therefore the majority must be committee members just to 
populate such committees.  Our results show that boards of firms that decide to appoint co-
CEOs have fewer independent directors than the average firm. This result affects both the 
monitoring and advising activities of the board. Overall, the sign and significance of the 
coefficients of our logit regressions suggest that co-CEOs substitute for board advising as well 
as various devices for the internal and external monitoring of CEOs. . 
The empirical analyses in Table 5 suggest an explanation why co-CEOships are 
                                                 
7
 In an alternative model specification described in our robustness analysis, we add a family indicator variable. 
We find that family is not a significant determinant of the decision to appoint co-CEOs.  In an untabulated 
analysis we add the Gompers, Iishi, and Metrick (2003) index.  However, only a small portion of our sample 
firms are covered by the IRRC database, limiting the statistical power of this test.  When we estimate this model 
across the IRRC subsample we fail to find statistical significance for the coefficient of the governance index 
variable. 
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uncommon. Our results show that relatively lower leverage, narrower firm focus, larger and 
less independent board structure, lower institutional ownership and greater merger activity 
increase the likelihood of shared executive leadership. Only a small number of firms can 
satisfy these conditions.  Particularly, past merger and acquisition activity appear to have a 
dominant influence on the likelihood that a co-CEOship is created.  The relative infrequency 
of merger activity for the average U.S. public firm provides partial insight into why co-
CEOships remain an unusual phenomenon.  Only 3.5% of the COMPUSTAT firm-year 
observations have at least one M&A transaction in the past three fiscal years, whereas this 
percentage is 23% for the co-CEO sample firms. These findings suggest that co-CEOships 
continue to remain relevant as an alternative governance mechanism, but to a smaller set of 
firms.   
We further examine the nature of changes in the likelihood of a co-CEOship to better 
understand the effect of past merger activity.  Because logistic models are linear in the logistic 
transformation of probability, but not in probability itself, we evaluate the other control 
variables at fixed values to compute base case probabilities. For these estimates, we evaluate 
all other variables at their sample medians and evaluate the merger activity indicator variable 
at zero. For the base case, the probability of having a co-CEO is 6%. When the merger 
activity dummy is evaluated at a value of 1, the probability of having a co-CEO becomes 
13%, implying an increase by a factor of more than two. 
 
6.  Relative co-CEO compensation 
There are two questions regarding co-CEO compensation that we investigate in this 
section. The first concerns the total amount of compensation paid to co-CEOs. That is, are co-
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CEOs twice as costly as a solitary CEO or are they proportionally less expensive?  If the 
existence of co-CEOs increases managerial entrenchment and agency conflicts, then co-CEO 
compensation is likely to be proportionately higher than that of solitary CEOs.  Alternatively, 
if the mutual monitoring derived of co-CEOs is an effective governance mechanism, then co-
CEO compensation might be proportionately less than solitary CEO compensation.   
The second question concerns the percentage of compensation that is incentive based.  
Is co-CEO compensation more or less incentive based than that of solitary CEOs? The mutual 
monitoring of co-CEOs might reduce agency conflict and require less incentive-based 
compensation on an individual basis.  Alternatively, if the presence of co-CEOs shifts power 
from the board to executive management, then more incentive-based compensation might be 
needed to reduce agency conflicts.    
 Table 6 contains our analysis of co-CEO compensation.  In this table we compare co-
CEO compensation with single CEO compensation for the same firm in the year prior and the 
year following the existence of a co-CEOship. Median values are reported for all 
compensation statistics.  All dollar amounts presented in the table are inflation adjusted in 
year 2000 dollars. 
We observe in panel A that co-CEOs as a team are more expensive than the traditional 
solitary CEO.  We find, however, that the co-CEO team is not twice as expensive as a single 
CEO.  Median total cash compensation for co-CEOs is 98% higher than that of a solitary 
CEO.  Larger discounts apply to other components of compensation for the co-CEO team. 
Salary is only 82% higher while the bonus is only 52% greater.  More surprisingly, the 
Wilcoxon test of the median shows that the two co-CEOs together are awarded fewer options 
and stock grants, with a lower dollar value than solitary CEOs.  This difference is consistent 
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with the reduced need for incentive compensation as suggested by the mutual monitoring 
hypothesis. 
 In panel B we examine the various compensation components for the co-CEOs on an 
individual basis.  Consistent with our results for the co-CEO team, we find that co-CEOs 
individually are paid less than solitary CEOs.  The median total cash compensation for co-
CEOs is 99% of that for single CEOs, while salary is only 91% as high.  The median bonus 
awarded a co-CEO is 12% lower than that of solitary CEOs.  This difference, however, is not 
statistically significant.  Lower cash compensation for co-CEOs might be explained by the 
fact that co-CEOs share managerial responsibilities and workload. 
We also observe in panel B that solitary CEOs receive significantly more incentive 
compensation than co-CEOs. The mean dollar value of option grants for solitary CEOs is over 
two and half times as large as that for co-CEOs.  The raw number of option grants for solitary 
CEOs is also over twice as large as that for co-CEOs.  When combined with the incentive-
based compensation results reported in panel A, we conclude that incentive-based 
compensation is used less often to reward co-CEOs.  This result is consistent with the 
contention that co-CEOs monitor each other, thereby reducing the need for incentive based 
compensation to reduce agency costs.
8
 
In untabulated results, we further investigate the use of incentive compensation by 
comparing the bonus-to-salary and bonus-to-total cash compensation ratios between solitary 
and co-CEOs.  We find that the bonus is nearly 45% as large as the salary for solitary CEOs 
compared to only 32.2% for co-CEOs, although not statistically significant. The 
corresponding value for bonus-to-total compensation is 31.4% (solitary CEO) and 24.7% (co-
                                                 
8
 We also replicate our compensation tests for the M&A sub-sample. The results are not significantly different 
from those generated with the entire sample.  
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CEO).   These results hold whether the co-CEOs are treated as a team or separately.  We also 
find that the difference between the higher paid co-CEO and the lower-paid co-CEO is not 
significant. 
For the sub-sample of our firms that are covered by EXECUCOMP we also perform 
other untabulated tests.  We examine the compensation gap between co-CEOs and other 
firm’s executives in various ways. First, we replicate the main finding of Kale, Reis, and 
Venkateswaran (2009) that there is a positive relation between the compensation gap 
(between CEO and VPs) and performance. Furthermore, we test whether this positive relation 
is more or less pronounced for co-CEO firms. We find that the positive relation between the 
compensation gap and performance is no different than that of single-CEO firms. Supporting 
this finding, we also verify that the compensation gap between CEO and VPs is comparable to 
the rest of the EXECUCOMP universe. This implies that co-CEO firms do not provide more 
tournament incentives than single-CEO firms. We conclude that there is no evidence of a co-
CEO compensation gap influencing firm performance. 
We also analyze pay-performance sensitivity. We find that co-CEO firms have 
stronger incentive alignments relative to the rest of the EXECUCOMP universe. We measure 
pay-performance sensitivity, COCEO_DELTA, as the average of (over the two co-CEOs) the 
change in value of CEO’s stock option and common stock portfolio for a one-percent change 
in the value of the firm’s common stock price as calculated by Core and Guay (2002).  We 
find that the co-CEO incentive alignment declines through the tenure of the co-CEOships that  
are formed and dissolved during our sample period. 
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7.  Market reaction and performance effects of shared leadership 
In this section we examine the market reaction surrounding the announcements of co-
CEO appointments and the impact that shared executive leadership exerts on firm operating 
performance and valuation. Our operating performance and valuation analysis uses a matched 
sample constructed on the basis of propensity scores.  
7.1. Announcement period returns  
 
If firms appoint co-CEOs when shared leadership has the potential to improve  
performance as suggested by Wasserman et al. (2001) and Pearce and Conger (2003), then the 
stock market should react positively to the announcement of the adoption of a co-CEO 
structure.  If, instead, shared leadership produces uncoordinated or poor decision-making by 
the firm (Mintzberg (1989); Hackman (2002)), then the market should react negatively to co-
CEO announcements.  The nature of the abnormal returns surrounding an announcement of a 
co-CEO appointment also has implications concerning whether such an arrangement means 
greater managerial entrenchment or provides mutual monitoring.  
To ensure that our results capture the market reaction to only the creation of a co-
CEOship, we eliminate those firms that announce the co-CEO appointment in conjunction 
with other news (e.g., merger, dividend change, earnings) and those that announce a new co-
CEO team, but are already lead by co-CEOs.  Further, we lose any sample firms that fail to 
announce their co-CEOships with a press release or are private in the year preceding the 
announcement.  Our final sample consists of 30 firms.  Nevertheless, this small sample still 
allows for meaningful analysis.  Kothari and Warner (2007), for instance, show that for short-
window event studies the power of the test is still high even when the observations are 
between 20 and 30. 
 We calculate abnormal returns surrounding the announcement date by estimating the 
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market model over the day -255 to day -46 window relative to the announcement date.  The 
market return is proxied by the CRSP value-weighted market index.  We obtain similar results 
when we estimate the market model with the CRSP equally-weighted market index.  Table 7 
presents the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) for the day of the announcement 
(0,0) a two-day period beginning at the announcement date (0,1), and a three-day period 
centered around the announcement date (-1,1).  Since ProQuest reports announcements with 
the date and time at which they were originally released, we believe that the (0,0) and (0,1) 
intervals provide results that are least likely to be influenced by confounding events.  
The CAARs are positive and statistically significant for all three examination windows 
based on the Brown and Warner (1985) test statistics.  The abnormal return for the 
announcement day is 2.58%.  The day (0,1) abnormal return is  2.81%,  while the day (-1,1) 
return is 6.19%.  These results provide supporting evidence that firms appoint co-CEOs when 
shared leadership is believed to be advantageous.  These results are also consistent with the 
mutual monitoring hypothesis.  
7.2. Propensity score analysis  
Using propensity score matching, we compare the expected valuation and operating 
performance of a firm with co-CEOs to the expected valuation and performance that would 
have been observed if the firm had a solitary CEO.  Using the methodology of Dehejia and 
Wahba (2002), we implement a commonly used matching algorithm: nearest neighbor 
matching.  The nearest neighbor method selects n control observations with the closest 
propensity score for each treatment observation.  We begin by computing the propensity 
scores based on Model 4 of Table 5. Next, we create three control samples based on the 
nearest neighbor algorithms.  We set n to 1, 4 and 6.  We match the control firms with 
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replacements to ensure high matching quality and stable coefficient estimates.
9
 
As suggested by Dehejia and Wahba (2002), we estimate the treatment effect due to 
the presence of co-CEOs by using weighted least squares regression.  Weights are assigned 
based on the number of times that a firm-year observation is matched as a control variable.
10
 
We consider two specifications. In the first specification we regress performance measures 
only on an indicator variable for the presence of co-CEOs.  In the second specification we 
include variables used to compute the propensity scores. 
In Table 8 we present the results of weighted least squares regressions with market-to-
book and return on assets as the dependent variables.  We find that co-CEO firms are 
associated with higher M/B relative to a matched sample.  Regardless of the matching 
algorithm and presence of the propensity covariates as additional controls, we find that the co-
CEO dummy is uniformly significantly positive.  This result, however, is not inconsistent 
with the previous finding that co-CEO mutual monitoring substitutes for other governance 
mechanisms.  The firm’s improved valuation might be the result of better decision-making 
due to the complementary expertise of the two co-CEOs and their mutual advising.  As 
described earlier, 44% of our sample co-CEOships possess complementarity in both CEO 
education and job responsibilities, while 45% of the co-CEOships exhibit complementarity in 
either education or job responsibilities. This analysis does not, however, examine whether co-
CEOs are able to influence the firm’s long-term performance. 
 It is also important to note that performance results obtained with propensity score 
                                                 
9
 Propensity scores for co-CEO and non-co-CEO samples overlap significantly.  A high degree of overlap 
provides two benefits. First, our findings become insensitive to the matching algorithm, increasing the reliability 
of our conclusions. Second, due to large pool of control firm candidates, matching quality increases. We also 
reconstruct our samples without allowing for replacements and re-estimate the analyses. Our findings remain 
unchanged.  
10
 Our results are not sensitive to the weighing scheme. OLS estimations yield virtually the same results, which 
are available upon request. 
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matching cannot be generalized to all firms.  Evaluations based on propensity score matched 
samples compare the value under co-CEO leadership to the unobserved value that would have 
occurred were that firm lead by a single CEO.  The improvements in valuation simply show 
that firms choosing to implement shared leadership indeed benefit from it.  It does not mean 
that any firm that appoints co-CEOs will necessarily improve its valuation. 
 
8.  Robustness Tests 
 In this section we provide the results from a series of untabulated robustness checks 
concerning co-CEOships. More specifically, we test to determine the effect that family and 
founder status have on the likelihood of a co-CEOship as well as provide an alternative test 
for endogeneity in the relation between co-CEOs and corporate governance.  
8.1. Family status  
 
Panel B of Table 1 shows that 25% of the co-CEO firms in our sample are family 
businesses.  This percentage is consistent with the incidence of family businesses among the 
totality of U.S. public corporations noted by researchers such as Anderson and Reeb (2003) 
and  Gadhoum et al. (2005).   This fact suggests that family status might not be a significant 
determinant of co-CEOships.   To determine the extent to which family status affects the 
likelihood of a co-CEOship, we add a family indicator variable equal to one when a founding 
family member is on the board or owns at least 20% of the firm to the regressions presented in 
Table 5.   Since the family data is hand-collected, the control sample is restricted to 500 
randomly selected firms instead of the totality of the COMPUSTAT universe.  We find that 
the family status indicator variable is statistically insignificant across all model specifications. 
All other coefficients are qualitatively identical to those presented in Table 5 with no changes 
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in either their signs or significance levels. 
8.2.   Founder and interim co-CEOs 
Panel B of Table 1 shows that 15% of co-CEOs are founders of the firm and 9% of the 
co-CEOships are interim arrangements in which the old CEO and the new one temporarily 
share executive responsibilities to facilitate transition. While we cannot test if the presence of 
founders in the company or if succession motives are significant determinants of the decision 
to appoint co-CEOs, we test if the Table 5 results are robust to the exclusions of founder and 
interim co-CEOs.  We find that the results presented in Table 5 hold even after eliminating all 
family founder and interim co-CEOs from our sample.  Therefore, we conclude that founder 
or interim co-CEO firms are not responsible for the major results of this study.  
8.3.  Endogeneity between co-CEOships and Corporate Governance  
 
Even though reverse causality does not appear to affect our logistic regressions due to 
the one-year lag between the independent variables and the co-CEO dependent variable, the 
decision to appoint co-CEOs and our governance variables (board size, percentage of 
independent directors, and institutional ownership) might be related to some other underlying, 
unobservable variable.  To verify that this type of endogeneity does not affect our empirical 
findings, we estimate a set of instrumental variable (IV) probit regressions. 
Specifically, we replicate the analysis presented in Table 5 using an IV two-stage 
approach to control for possible endogeneity between co-CEOship and our set of corporate 
governance explanatory variables.  Consistent with Boone, Field, Karpoff, and Raheja (2007),  
we instrument our governance variables with the lagged values of these variables.  We also 
include the other variables originally included in the Table 5 regressions in these new 
instrumented regressions.   The sign and significance of the coefficients in the second-stage 
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IV probit regressions are qualitatively identical with those presented in Table 5.  Overall, the 
evidence offered by the IV probit regressions suggests that our results are robust to 
endogeneity concerns. 
 
9.  Conclusion 
This study provides a number of interesting descriptive statistics regarding the nature 
of co-CEOs.  We find that the creation of co-CEOships is broadly distributed across 
industries.  We further note that complementarity in educational preparation or the assignment 
of executive responsibilities is widespread in co-CEOships.   
We find that there are several factors which are associated with the creation of a co-
CEOship. The most significant determinant of co-CEO appointments is M&A activity.  Firms 
involved in a merger will sometimes decide to appoint the CEOs of the acquirer and target as 
co-CEOs of the new firm.  Additionally, consistent with Wasserman et al. (2001) we 
determine that firms in which CEOs have more discretionary power as implied by lower debt 
levels, higher quantities of excess cash, and greater industry concentration, are more likely to 
adopt co-CEO leadership structures.  Further, we discover that co-CEOs are most likely to 
emerge in firms that encourage the development of powerful executives through a weak board 
structure and low levels of leverage or institutional ownership.  However, if CEOs have more 
power in the boardroom they are less likely to share their leadership with a co-CEO.  
Moreover, we show that complementarity in skills and expertise among co-CEOs 
supplements board advising.  We also find from a series of instrumental variable regressions 
that the effect of governance on co-CEO creation is robust to possible endogeneity.  
Additionally, we discover that co-CEOs are compensated proportionately less than 
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solitary CEOs.  Co-CEOs are relatively less costly across all components of their 
compensation: fixed salary, bonus, and option grants.  This result is inconsistent with  
entrenchment effects resulting from a co-CEOship since entrenchment would likely produce 
higher CEO salaries.  We find that incentive pay represents a smaller percent of compensation 
for co-CEOs than for single CEOs.  Possibly, incentive compensation is less needed for co-
CEOs because of their mutual monitoring.  
Finally, we examine the influence that co-CEOs have upon firm valuation and 
performance. We begin by determining that the market reacts positively to the announcement 
of co-CEOs, suggesting that the market capitalizes the anticipated reduction in agency costs 
associated with mutual monitoring.  We then describe how the presence of co-CEOs affects 
corporate valuation and operating performance.  Specifically, we observe that the presence of 
a co-CEO has a positive impact on a firm’s market-to-book ratio, a result that is also 
inconsistent with entrenchment. Since the mutual monitoring of co-CEOs substitutes for other 
governance mechanisms, the impact of co-CEOships on value might be the result of their 
complementary skills which supplement the advisory role of the board.  
The combined evidence provided by the instrumental variable regressions, the 
compensation analysis, and the market-to-book results suggests that co-CEOs can serve as an 
alternative governance mechanism, with their mutual monitoring substituting for more 
conventional board or external monitoring of CEOs. Co-CEO complementarity also provides 
a substitute for board advising. 
The importance of these findings resides in several areas. First, it establishes that there 
are effective alternative leadership models to that of the solitary CEO.  Our findings regarding 
job and responsibility complementarity within the co-CEO team suggest that this management 
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design can focus substantial strengths toward the strategic leadership of the firm.  Our results 
further show that the design of the senior leadership structure can reduce agency problems 
between management and shareholders.  The creation of a co-CEOship that can mutually 
monitor represents another governance mechanism that can better align shareholder interests 
with those of corporate insiders. 
The evidence presented in this study is inconsistent with the premise that reduced 
CEO authority leads to lower CEO effort as suggested by Stein (1988), Aghion and Tirole 
(1997), and Almazan and Suarez (2003).  This literature argues that most CEOs prefer to be a 
solitary CEO and not part of a dual CEO arrangement. Even though the small number of co-
CEO firms in our sample initially appears consistent with this argument, we find for those 
firms that decide to appoint co-CEOs, the resultant sharing of executive authority does not 
lead to shirking by the CEOs.  Finally, our results validate the continued importance of 
management to the firm’s activities.  Our findings are consistent with Drucker (1954) claim 
that managers create, perceive, and pursue opportunities, thus accounting for differences in 
organizational performance.  
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Table 1 
Characteristics of co-CEO Firms 
 
This table provides descriptive statistics for the sample firms.  Panel A presents the distribution of our sample 
firms by industry based on one-digit SIC codes.  Panel B identifies the circumstances associated with co-CEO 
creation. Panel C provides univariate statistics regarding the tenure of co-CEOs. The first two rows in panel C 
present co-CEO tenure at the firm level (aggregating subsequent co-CEO tenures for the same firm), at the CEO 
level, and at the CEO level by motivation.  Panel D provides descriptive statistics on co-CEOs’ participation to 
the board as directors and chairs.  Panel E and F contain data concerning the employment of co-CEOs preceding 
and following their tenure as co-CEOs.  
 
Panel A: Industry distribution 
    
Industry 
  
N % 
Mining and construction 
  
3 3% 
Manufacturing 
  
33 30% 
Transportation, communication, electric, gas and services 
  
7 6% 
Wholesale-retail trade 
  
14 13% 
Finance, insurance and real estate 
  
28 25% 
Services 
  
25 23% 
Public Administration 
  
1 1% 
 
Panel B: Circumstances associated with co-CEO creation   
    
Motivation 
  
N % 
M&A 
  
22 20% 
Family 
  
28 25% 
Co-Founders 
  
17 15% 
Interim 
  
10 9% 
Other 
  
34 31% 
 
Panel C: Co-CEO duration length (in years)  
     
  N Mean Median Min Max 
All Sample - Firm Level 111 4.69 2.83 0.13 35 
All Sample - CEO Level 118 4.37 2.7 0.13 32.33 
Co-Founders- CEO Level 17 7.15 3.75 0.58 32.33 
Family- CEO Level 26 6.71 6.58 0.58 26 
Interim- CEO Level 10 1.04 0.67 0.13 3.25 
Merger- CEO Level 20 2.39 1.83 0.33 9.25 
Other- CEO Level 45 3.60 1.83 0.25 17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Panel D: Role of Co-CEOs on the Board of Directors (firm-year observations) 
  
   
N % 
Both co-CEOs are directors 
   
334 93% 
One co-CEO is a director 
   
13 4% 
Neither co-CEO is a director 
   
11 3% 
The co-CEOs are co-Chairs of the Board 
   
108 30% 
One co-CEO is the Chair of the Board 
   
192 54% 
Neither co-CEO is the Chair of the Board 
   
58 16% 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 2 
Descriptive overview of the educational background of co-CEOs 
This table examines the highest educational achievement of co-CEOs on two dimensions: (1) educational level 
and (2) field of study.  Panel A presents the highest educational level for each co-CEO.  Panel B lists the field of 
the highest degree earned by each co-CEO.  Panel C presents the highest educational level for each co-CEO pair 
in the sample. 
 
Panel A: Highest educational level of co-CEOs 
 Education Number % of non-missing 
Graduate degree 104 56.52% 
Undergraduate degree 74 40.22% 
Some college 3 1.63% 
Some high school 3 1.63% 
Missing 73   
   
Panel B: Field of study for highest educational level of co-CEOs 
Education Number % of non-missing 
Graduate degree 
  
MBA 53 51.46% 
Technical 21 20.39% 
JD 19 18.45% 
Other 10 9.71% 
Missing 1 
 
   
Undergraduate degree 
  
Business 27 44.76% 
Technical 12 20.34% 
Other 20 33.90% 
Missing 15   
   Panel C: Highest educational level of co-CEO pairs 
 Education Number % of non-missing 
Both co-CEOs have graduate degree 28 25.69% 
One co-CEO has graduate degree 48 44.04% 
Both co-CEOs have undergraduate degree 16 14.68% 
One co-CEO has undergraduate degree 14 12.84% 
Neither co-CEO has university degree 3 2.75% 
Both missing 9   
 
 Table 3 
Complementarity in fields of study and the assignment of duty of co-CEOs 
This table examines the extent to which there are differences in assignments of duty and fields of study 
(measured at the beginning of the co-CEO appointment) between a co-CEO team. Each pair of co-CEO is treated 
as a single observation. Assignment of duty is classified as complementary if co-CEOs have different 
responsibilities. Field of study is classified as complementary if one of the co-CEO has at least one different 
degree than those of the other co-CEO. Due to data limitations, Panel A, B and C are based on 67, 86 and 54 co-
CEO firms. 
 
 
Panel A: The extent of complementarity in the field of study 
  Complementary Uncomplementary 
Number of firms 50 17 
Percentage of firms 74.63% 25.37% 
   
   Panel B: The extent of complementarity in the assignment of co-CEO responsibilities 
  Complementary Uncomplementary 
Number of firms 54 32 
Percentage of firms 62.79% 37.21% 
 
 
Panel C: Complementarity based on field of study and assignment of co-CEO responsibilities 
  Assignment of co-CEO responsibilities n (%) 
Complementary Uncomplementary 
Field of study  Complementary  23 (42.59%) 17 (31.48%) 
n (%) Uncomplementary  8 (14.81%) 6 (11.11%) 
 
 Table 4 
Univariate Analysis of the Determinants of a co-CEO Structure   
 
This table presents a univariate comparison of possible determinants of a co-CEOship. The sample period is 1998-2008. MVE is the market value of equity in $ 
millions (item #19*item#25).  D is the ratio of long-term debt to book value of assets (item #9/item #6). FCF is the free-cash flow scaled by the book value of 
assets ([item #13-  item #16 – item #15 – item #19 – item #21+Δitem #35]/item #6). CEOPOWER equals 1 if the CEO is the only insider on board, otherwise 0. 
ADVISINGBOARD equals 1 if only a minority of independent board members serve on at least two of the three major committees of the board (audit, 
compensation and nominating). PERINDEP is the proportion of independent board members on the board. INSTOWN is the proportion of institutional 
ownership. SEGNUM is the number of business segments. HERF is a revenue-based Herfindahl index computed at 3-digit SIC level.  
 
 
 
Variable 
co-CEO Sample 
(1) 
 
co-CEO Sample 
(without M&A) 
(2) 
 
COMPUSTAT Sample 
(3) 
p-values for differences  
in medians (or means when 
reported) 
(3-1) (3-2) 
Medians   
(Means are 
 provided  
for dummy 
 variables) 
N 
Medians   
(Means are 
 provided  
for dummy 
 variables) 
N 
Medians   
(Means are 
 provided  
for dummy 
 variables) 
N 
MVE 387.47 334 336.83 256 117.95 73,843 0.0000 0.0000 
D 0.1201 332 0.0943 254 0.0827 73,391 0.0055 0.1399 
FCF 0.0472 313 0.0524 240 0.0218 71,417 0.0000 0.0001 
CEOPOWER 0.3916 332 0.4118 255 0.5225 21,583 0.0000 0.0004 
ADVISINGBOARD 0.4414 333 0.4180 256 0.6316 21,583 0.0000 0.0000 
PERINDEP 0.5556 333 0.5714 255 0.7000 21,583 0.0000 0.0000 
INSTOWN 0.4136 334 0.4136 256 0.2314 73,843 0.0000 0.0000 
SEGNUM 2.0000 289 1.0000 224 1.0000 62,585 0.0183 0.4056 
HERF 0.1538 334 0.1573 256 0.1126 73,843 0.0037 0.0008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 5 
Multivariate Analyses of the Determinants of a co-CEOship   
This table presents a panel-data logistic analysis of the determinants of a co-CEOship. The sample period is 1998-2008. The dependent variable equals 1 when 
the firm has two CEOs, otherwise 0. The independent variables are lagged by one year (t-1).  LOGMVE is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity in $ 
millions (item #19*item#25. D is the ratio of long-term debt to book value of assets (item #9/item #6). SEGNUM is the number of business segments. FCF is the 
free-cash flow scaled by the book value of assets ([item #13-  item #16 – item #15 – item #19 – item #21+Δitem #35]/item #6). HERF is a revenue-based 
Herfindahl index computed at 3-digit SIC level. CEOPOWER equals 1 if the CEO is the only insider on board, otherwise 0. ADVISINGBOARD equals 1 if only a 
minority of independent board members serve on at least two of the three major committees of the board (audit, compensation and nominating). PERINDEP is 
the proportion of independent board members on the board. INSTOWN is the proportion of institutional ownership. MERGER_ACTIVITY equals 1 if the firm 
acquires a firm over the past three fiscal years, otherwise 0.  SOX is set to one if the firm-year observation corresponds to post-SOX period, otherwise zero. 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent Variables Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
Intercept 1.2656 0.0002 0.9599 0.0078 1.1930 0.0010 0.7401 0.0525 1.1136 0.0022 
LOGMVEt-1 -0.4333 0.0000 -0.4347 0.0000 -0.4316 0.0000 -0.4372 0.0000 -0.4283 0.0000 
Dt-1 -1.2330 0.0003 -1.3561 0.0001 -0.9268 0.0095 -1.0007 0.0069 -0.9412 0.0088 
SEGNUMt-1 -0.1086 0.0094 -0.1162 0.0065 -0.1281 0.0022 -0.1443 0.0008 -0.1336 0.0014 
FCFt-1 0.7149 0.0836 0.3535 0.3771 0.7895 0.0773 0.3921 0.3599 0.6528 0.1395 
HERFt-1 0.6829 0.0819 0.7890 0.0486 0.8323 0.0372 1.0336 0.0118 0.9214 0.0222 
CEOPOWERt-1 -0.5339 0.0007 -0.4961 0.0020 -0.5056 0.0016 -0.4425 0.0069 -0.4320 0.0078 
ADVISINGBOARDt-1 -0.8781 0.0000 -0.9867 0.0000 -0.9089 0.0000 -1.0589 0.0000 -0.9860 0.0000 
PERINDEPt-1 -1.6990 0.0000 -1.3512 0.0010 -1.5312 0.0002 -0.9674 0.0238 -1.2234 0.0041 
INSTOWNt-1 -3.1472 0.0000 -3.1012 0.0000 -3.2756 0.0000 -3.2123 0.0000 -3.1803 0.0000 
MERGER_ACTIVITYt-1 0.9329 0.0000 0.8810 0.0000 0.9519 0.0000 0.8432 0.0000 0.8856 0.0000 
SOX 
        
-0.4686 0.0025 
Industry fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects No Yes No Yes No 
N 16,175 16,175 16,175 16,175 16,175 
Pseudo R
2
 0.224 0.238 0.261 0.279 0.264 
  
Table 6 
Comparative Compensation Analysis between Solitary and co-CEOs 
 
This table presents a univariate analysis of CEO compensation for our sample firms. The “Solitary CEO” 
statistics refer to compensation for our sample firms in the two years preceding and following a co-CEO’s 
tenure. The “co-CEOs” statistics refer to the CEO compensation for our sample firms during the co-CEO tenure.  
Total cash compensation (TOTALCASHCOMP) is the sum of salary (SALARY) and bonus (BONUS) measured in 
dollars. GRANTS is the dollar value of new stock grants. OPTIONS is the number of new option grants. Total 
cash compensation, salary, bonus, and grants are reported in 2000 dollars.  Panel A presents the sum of the 
compensation figures for the two CEOs.  Panel B presents compensation figures on an individual basis. 
 
Panel A: Aggregate Compensation 
 
Solitary CEO 
 
co-CEOs 
 
p-values of 
differences 
  Mean Median   Mean Median   Mean Median 
TOTALCASHCOMP 969,424 489,385 
 
1,823,936 972,497 
 
0.000 0.000 
SALARY 454,182 347,545 
 
800,839 633,288 
 
0.000 0.000 
BONUS 510,845 119,663 
 
988,572 181,623 
 
0.009 0.071 
GRANTS 352,131 0 
 
262,753 0 
 
0.326 0.011 
OPTIONS 373,811 70,000   340,779 25,000   0.749 0.013 
Number of Firms 85               
                  
Panel B: Individual Compensation 
  Solitary CEO   co-CEOs   
p-values of 
differences 
  Mean Median   Mean Median   Mean Median 
TOTALCASHCOMP 969,424 489,385 
 
911,968 486,248 
 
0.645 0.095 
SALARY 454,182 347,545 
 
400,420 316,644 
 
0.069 0.014 
BONUS 510,845 119,663 
 
494,286 90,811 
 
0.880 0.263 
GRANTS 352,131 0 
 
131,377 0 
 
0.001 0.005 
OPTIONS 373,811 70,000   170,389 12,500   0.008 0.000 
Number of Firms 85               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 7 
Abnormal Announcement Returns 
This table presents abnormal announcement returns of firms announcing a switch from a classic single CEO 
leadership structure to a co-CEO structure.  We calculate the abnormal announcement returns by means of a 
market model with an estimation period of 255 days that terminates 46 days before the announcement.  We 
exclude firms that announce the initiation of a co-CEOship in combination with other events (merger, dividend 
change or initiation, etc.). The market returns used in the model are the CRSP value-weighted returns. CAAR is 
the cumulative average abnormal return, Z-statistic is based on Patell (1976) test, and t-statistic is adjusted for 
time series correction of Brown and Warner (1985). 
 
Event window N CAAR Z-statistic t-statistic 
(0,0) 30 2.58% 2.711 2.568 
(0,1) 30 2.81% 2.065 1.975 
(-1,1) 30 6.19% 3.626 3.558 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8 
Operating Performance and co-CEOs  
This table examines valuation and operating performance differences between co-CEO and non-co-CEO firms 
using matched samples. Matching is based on propensity scores computed as the predicted probabilities of 
establishing co-CEO stewardship based on nearest neighbor matching. Matching is done on the common support 
of the propensity scores. For brevity the coefficient estimates for co-CEO dummy (α1) from the following 
weighted least squares regressions are reported: 
M/Bt = α0 + α1COCEO_DUMt + ε        [1] 
M/Bt = α0 + α1COCEO_DUMt + α X + ε       [2] 
ROAt = α0 + α1COCEO_DUMt + ε        [3] 
ROAt = α0 + α1COCEO_DUMt + α X + ε       [4] 
Valuation, M/B, is measured as the natural logarithm of market to book ratio computed as the ratio of market 
value of assets to book value of assets ([item #6  - item #60 + item #74 + item #19*item#25]/item #6). Operating 
performance, ROA, is measured as the ratio of operating income before depreciation to book value of assets 
(item #13/item #6). COCEO_DUMt equals to 1 when the firm has two CEOs, otherwise equals to 0. X denotes 
the vector of covariates used to compute the propensity scores in Model 4 of Table 5. Weights are assigned 
based on the number of occurrences for each matched firm-year observation.  
 
Equation 
Nearest neighbor (n) 
n = 1 n = 4 n = 6 
α1 p-value α1 p-value α1 p-value 
[1] M/B 0.3009 0.0000 0.3009 0.0000 0.3009 0.0000 
[2] M/B 0.1993 0.0000 0.1973 0.0000 0.1980 0.0000 
[3] ROA -0.0159 0.1864 -0.0159 0.1403 -0.0159 0.1348 
[4] ROA -0.0166 0.0719 -0.0125 0.1362 -0.0121 0.1461 
Number of treated observations 241 241 241 
Number of matched observations 241 964 1,446 
 
